



**The Constitutional Court  
of the Republic of Indonesia**

**SUMMARY OF THE DECISION  
OF CASES NUMBER 20 / PUU-XVII / 2019**

**About**

**Electronic Identity Card (KTP-el) and Certificate of Recording of KTP-el**

- Petitioner : Association for Elections and Democracy (Perludem), Hadar Nafis Gumay,  
et al.
- Type of Case : Examination of Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning General Elections  
(Election Law) against The Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia of 1945
- Case Lawsuit : Article 210 paragraph (1), Article 348 paragraph (4), Article 348 paragraph  
(9), Article 350 paragraph (2), and Article 383 paragraph (2) of the Election  
Law contradicts Article 22E paragraph (1), Article 27 paragraph ( 1), Article  
28C paragraph (2), Article 28D paragraph (1), Article 28D paragraph (3),

Article 28I paragraph (2), and Article 28I paragraph (4) of the 1945 Constitution.

Injunction : In Provision: Granted the provisional petition of Petitioner I, Petitioner IV, Petitioner V, Petitioner VI, and Petitioner VII.

In the Principal of Application:

1. To grant Petitioner I, Petitioner IV, Petitioner V, Petitioner VI, and Petitioner VII partly;
2. Stating that the phrase "electronic identity card" in Article 348 paragraph (9) of Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning General Elections (State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia of 2017 Number 182 and Supplement to State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia Number 6109) is contrary to The Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia of 1945 and does not have legally binding force conditionally as long as it is not interpreted as "including a certificate of electronic identity card recording issued by the population service and civil registration or other institutions of the like that have the authority to do so."
3. Stating the phrase "no later than 30 (thirty) days" in Article 210 paragraph (1) of Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning General Elections (State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia of 2017 Number 182 and Supplement to State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia Number 6109) is contrary to Law - The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. It does not have a legally binding force conditionally as long as it is not interpreted "no later than 30 (thirty) days before voting day, except for voters due to unforeseen conditions beyond the voters' ability and willingness due to the illness being hit by a

disaster. Nature, being a prisoner, and for carrying out their duties at the time of voting are determined no later than 7 (seven) days before the polling day".

4. Stating the phrase "only carried out and finished at the TPS / TPSLN concerned on voting day" in Article 383 paragraph (2) of Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning General Elections (State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia of 2017 Number 182 and Supplement to the State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia Number 6109) contradicts the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia and does not have legally binding force conditionally as long as it is not interpreted as "only done and completed at the TPS / TPSLN concerned on polling day and in the event that the vote count has not been completed it can be extended without a pause of no later than 12 (twelve) hours from the end of the voting day".
5. Stating that the petition of Petitioner II and Petitioner III cannot be accepted.
6. Reject the petition of Petitioner I, Petitioner IV, Petitioner V, Petitioner VI, and Petitioner VII for other than and the rest.
7. Order the loading of this decision in the State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia accordingly.

Date of the Decision : Thursday, 28<sup>th</sup> of March 2019.

Decision Overview :

The Petitioners argue that each as a private legal entity (Perludem) and an individual Indonesian citizen feel their constitutional rights have been impaired by the enactment of Article 210 paragraph (1), Article 348 paragraph (4), Article 348 paragraph (9), Article 350 paragraph (2) ), and Article 383 paragraph (2) of the Election Law.

The Petitioners argued that in essence, (1) The requirement to have an e-KTP as a condition for using the right to vote for citizens who have not been registered in the Election Permanent Voters List (DPT) has impaired the Petitioners' constitutional rights. (2) Limitation on the right to vote only for candidates according to the constituency where registered voters for voters who have moved to elect has resulted in the loss of the right of the changing voters to exercise their right to elect candidates for legislative members. (3) Limitation of the period of registration of voters into the DPTb no later than 30 days prior to polling day is causing obstruction, blocking some voters' rights who move to vote due to unforeseen conditions. (4) Restrictions on the formation of DPT-based TPS have hampered several voters from exercising their voting rights. (5) The time limit for vote counting that must be completed on polling day can cause legal issues to arise, which could interfere with the validity of the Election.

The Petitioners also submitted a petition for provisions, which basically requested that the Court prioritize the examination of the a quo case and issue a decision before the 2019 Election voting, which will be held on April 17, 2019.

Regarding the petition for provision of the Petitioners, because according to the Court, the Petitioners' petition has implications for the use of voting rights in the voting which will be held on April 17, 2019, by sticking to the procedural law in force in the Constitutional Court, the Petitioners' petition for provisions is legally grounded.

Concerning the authority of the Constitutional Court, the Court believes that following the provisions of Article 24C paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution in conjunction with Article 10 paragraph (1) of the Constitutional Court Law, the Court has the authority to judge at the first and last levels whose decisions are final in order to test the constitutionality of Article 348

paragraph (9 ), Article 348 paragraph (4), Article 210 paragraph (1), Article 350 paragraph (2), and Article 383 paragraph (2) of the Election Law against the 1945 Constitution.

Regarding the legal standing of the Petitioners, the Court believes that some of the Petitioners, namely Petitioner I, Petitioner IV, Petitioner V, Petitioner VI, and Petitioner VII, have legal standing to act as Petitioners.

Regarding the Petitioners' arguments, the Court believes that concerning the five main issues contained in the five formulations of the norms of the Election Law, the Court considers the following:

1. Whereas based on the legal reasons described above, the Court maintains the belief that the minimum requirement for voters to exercise their voting rights is to have an e-KTP following the Population Administration Law. In the event that the e-KTP is not yet owned, while the person concerned has met the requirements to have the right to vote before the e-KTP is obtained, the person concerned can use or use the e-KTP recording certificate from the population affairs office and the civil registry of the relevant agency as a substitute for the KTP- el.

It does not mean that the Court has changed its stance as confirmed in the previous decisions with such a stance. The previous Court decision that allowed citizens to use a number of personal identification cards to vote (for voters who were not registered in the DPT) was when population data was not integrated with electoral data so that there was a potential where citizens could not exercise their voting rights. Meanwhile, at this time, the data integration has been carried out so that the reason for using another identity other than the e-KTP has lost the basis for maintaining it in the context of using the right to vote. This is because if this view is not adjusted to the development of integrating population data and

electoral data, it will disrupt the validity of population data and electoral data, which will lead to the legitimacy of the election.

Based on the above considerations, some of the Petitioners' arguments are related to Article 348 paragraph 9. The Election Law is legally grounded insofar as the term "electronic identity card" is also interpreted to include "certificate of recording e-KTPs issued by the population and civil registration service (Disdukcapil)". Thus, Article 348 paragraph (9) of the Election Law must be declared conditionally unconstitutional as long as it is not interpreted, "Residents who already have the right to vote as referred to in paragraph (1) letter d can vote at TPS / TPSLN by using an electronic identity card or certificate. Recording e-KTPs issued by the population and civil registration service (Disdukcapil) or other similar agencies that have the authority to do so".

In connection with the Court's legal considerations above, the Court needs to remind the government to speed up recording e-KTPs for citizens who have not recorded them, especially those who already have the right to vote so that it can be realized before voting day.

Whereas based on the aforementioned legal considerations, the argument for the a quo petition, namely concerning Article 348 paragraph (9) of the Election Law, is contrary to the 1945 Constitution and does not have binding legal force as long as it is not interpreted as "in the case of not having an electronic KTP, other identity cards may be used, namely, non-electronic KTP, certificate, birth certificate, family card, marriage book, or other means of identity that can prove that the person concerned has the right to vote, such as the Voters Card issued by the General Election Commission "is legally reasonable in part.

2.Regarding Voting Rights for Voters Who Change Voting.

Whereas the provisions contained in Article 348 paragraph (4) of the Election Law are applied to "Voters with certain conditions" as referred to in Article 348 paragraph (3) of the Election Law. What is meant by "Voters with certain conditions", as stipulated in the Elucidation of Article 348 paragraph (3) of the Election Law, are voters who are currently studying and/or working outside their domicile, are sick, and voters who are currently serving prison or imprisonment. Meanwhile, restrictions on the right to vote for candidates/election participants as stipulated in Article 348 paragraph (4) of the Election Law are a logical consequence of electoral districts' existence and establishment. In this case, the electoral districts determine the boundaries of the electoral areas for election participants and the electoral boundaries for voters. This means that the electoral district is the limit on using the right to vote, both the right to vote and the right to be elected. In that context, the regulation of limiting the right to vote for election participants at a certain level based on the electoral district is a very logical and not exaggerated legal policy.

There was no such regulation regarding the previous electoral regulations that could not be used as a benchmark for assessing regulatory changes and/or developments. As long as the change in rules is still within limits aimed at maintaining justice and proportionality of the election procedure, it cannot be considered a limitation inconsistent with the 1945 Constitution, especially regarding constitutional rights related to voting rights. The Court will further consider the following matters:

First, to exercise people's sovereignty, elections are technically understood as a mechanism for converting people's votes into seats in representative institutions. The converted people's voice is the voice of the people who elect their representatives in the election. The process of converting people's votes into seats is canalized through the implementation of

regional-based elections. This canalization means that the electoral process is carried out on an electoral basis and means that the electoral district is a representative area so that the elected representatives of the people are responsible to the constituents in the electoral district where they are elected. This means that the people's votes that are converted into seats for members of representative institutions (both DPR, DPD, Provincial DPRD, and Regency / Municipal DPRD) have a consequence in the emergence of a model of accountability for members of people's representative institutions based on electoral districts. Thus, with the existence of electoral districts, each member of the elected representative institutions' accountability becomes clear, both regionally and to the people/voters who mandate the election.

As the basis for elections and the accountability of elected representatives of the people, the electoral district is also the basis for the relationship between representatives and those they represent. An electoral district is an area where two subjects in a representative system interact with each other. In order for the interaction between representatives and those represented as subjects in an electoral district, the people's representatives who are elected must be people who can be held accountable by the people/voters. At the same time, the people who vote are also people who can hold their representatives accountable. Of course, what is meant by accountability, in this case, is political accountability. In such a position, only the people who are elected and the voters who are registered and voting in one electoral district can be connected in a representative and represented relationship. Therefore, limiting voters' right to elect candidates/participants in the place-based elections where they are registered as permanent voters is a legal policy that does not conflict with the design of an election system that is honest and fair and, at the same time, accountable.



Second, restrictions on the right to elect candidates/election participants according to the level as stipulated in Article 348 paragraph (4) of the Election Law apply based on the scale of voting. In a sense, the inapplicable right to vote is the right to elect a candidate in an electoral area left behind. However, if the voter moves to choose is still in the same electoral district, then a voter still has the right to choose the candidate/election participant in question. Such a legal framework cannot be considered a deprivation of the right to vote for legislative members as argued by the Petitioners. This is because the right to vote for candidates/election participants for voters who do not come from the electoral district concerned does not exist. This means that when the voters have left their constituency, their right to vote is no longer valid. When the right to vote is still given to voters whose base of representation is not in the electoral district concerned, the concept of electoral area boundaries and elected representatives' responsibilities will become unclear. Therefore, what is stipulated in Article 348 paragraph (4) of the Election Law is in principle to maintain the purity of the electoral district-based electoral system and at the same time to maintain the clarity of the accountability system for elected representatives of the people to voters who come from the electoral district concerned.

Based on these legal considerations, the Court believes that the a quo Petitioners' argument, which states that Article 348 paragraph (4) of the Election Law is contrary to the 1945 Constitution, is legally groundless.

### 3.Regarding the deadline for registration of voters to move to choose.

Regarding the deadline for registration of voters to move to choose whereas, within certain limits, the time limit no later than 30 (thirty) days before the voting day for voters who have moved to choose for certain reasons so that they can be registered in the DPTb

can qualify as a rational-legal policy. Rational in the sense that by limiting the time frame referred to, the election organizer has the opportunity to prepare the logistical needs of the election to serve the right to vote for voters who have moved to elect. Without the stipulation of the timeframe, when the number of voters who have moved to vote occurs in large numbers and accumulates in certain areas, the voters' voting rights will not be fulfilled. In that context, the determination of the said period of time can also be considered as a legal fabrication so that voters who move to vote can really be served their voting rights. Thus, for the context of how election administrators can serve the voting rights of citizens who move to vote, the restriction policy no later than 30 (thirty) days before the voting day is a legal policy that cannot generally be considered contrary to the 1945 Constitution.

Whereas even so, the time limitation still contains the potential for non-service of the right to vote for citizens who experience certain circumstances beyond the capacity and willingness of those concerned. In this case, no one can predict when someone will experience illness, legally problematic problems so that they will be detained or be hit by a natural disaster. This could happen to voters in the near future of polling day so that they have to move to vote.

That the need for a period of time to prepare services for voters who have moved to elect and efforts to fulfill the right to vote for citizens who have experienced certain conditions or circumstances (illness, being detained, suffering from natural disasters, or carrying out duties at the time of voting) which require them to move to vote are two things that are both important, one cannot negate the other. In a sense, the reason for serving citizens' right to vote must still be within the framework of allowing sufficient time for the

organizers to prepare all voting equipment. At the same time, the reason for allowing sufficient time for the organizers must not neglect the voting rights of citizens who experience certain circumstances. Therefore, to fulfill the right to vote and the need for sufficient time for election administrators, the limits must be proportionally determined so that the principle of holding elections fairly and fairly to fulfill citizens' voting rights can still be fulfilled.

Based on these reasons, the deadline for voters to be registered in the DPTb no later than 30 (thirty) days before voting day must be maintained because it is estimated that the election organizers can meet the logistical needs of the election. However, the time limit no later than 30 (thirty) days before the voting day must be exempted for voters who are registered as voters who have moved to vote for reasons of certain circumstances, namely, illness, being hit by natural disasters, being detained, and for carrying out their duties at during voting, the said voters can move their vote and be registered in the DPTb no later than 7 (seven) days before the voting day. This means that only voters who experience certain conditions can change choice within a period of no later than 7 (seven) days before polling day. As for voters who do not have certain conditions, the provisions shall remain in effect no later than 30 (thirty) days before polling day.

That it is necessary to separate such time limits to prevent large numbers of voting for reasons of work or other reasons approaching polling day so that there is no longer sufficient time for organizers to provide additional election logistics. Within the limits of reasonable reasoning, time availability is such an essential basis for consideration because limited time will present other conditions, namely the potential not to fulfill the right to vote because there is not enough time to fulfill additional election logistics by the

organizers properly. If such conditions occur, the election results are potential to be questioned, and the election organizers will easily be judged not to hold elections in a professional manner. Therefore, in order to avoid problems in the voting process due to insufficient ballot papers and other logistics, the exception to the validity of the deadline no later than 30 (thirty) days before the voting day can only be applied to voters who experience certain conditions as described above.

Whereas based on the above legal considerations, the Petitioners' argument related to the constitutionality of Article 210 paragraph (1) of the Election Law insofar as it is intended to protect the right to vote for voters who experience certain circumstances is legally reasonable for some, but not by changing the time limit no later than 30 (three twenty) days becomes 3 (three) days prior to polling day, but by applying an exception to voters who experience certain conditions. Thus, the time limit is no later than 30 (thirty) days before the voting day as referred to in Article 210 paragraph (1) of the Election Law does not apply to voters in certain circumstances, namely voters who experience illness, are hit by natural disasters, become detainees for committing a criminal act or running errands at the time of voting. For the sake of, on the one hand, the constitutional rights of voters are still fulfilled in certain circumstances to exercise their voting rights, and on the other hand, the organizers have sufficient time to guarantee the availability of logistics related to the fulfillment of these rights, then the time is no later than 7 (seven) days before the polling day. Votes is a reasonable time limit for a stipulation regarding the deadline for such voters to be registered in the DPTb.

#### 4.Regarding the Establishment of Additional TPS

Whereas it must be understood that the norm construction of Article 350 paragraph (2) of the Election Law does not regulate the basis for TPS formation, as understood and argued by the Petitioners, but is related to the requirements for the location of the TPS establishment. In this case, TPS's establishment must be located in a place that is easily accessible to voters, not combining villages, paying attention to geographical aspects and ensuring that every voter can cast their votes directly, freely, and confidentially. So, the emphasis lies on the phrase "guaranteeing every voter can cast their votes directly, freely and confidentially," which are none other than three of the six essential principles in elections, which are explicitly stated in Article 22E paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution. Desired by the phrase "guarantee that every voter can vote directly, freely and confidentially" is the location chosen to form the polling station. This means that TPS may not be placed in a location that does not guarantee voters to be able to cast their votes directly, freely, and confidentially. Whereas because the norm construction of Article 350 paragraph (2) of the Election Law is related to the requirements for the location of TPS, the a quo norm cannot be used as a legal basis for the establishment of additional TPS aimed at accommodating voters who have moved to elect who are concentrated in certain areas that have the potential not to exercise their rights choose it. Based on such considerations, the Petitioners' petition that the phrase "guarantee that every voter can cast their votes directly, freely, and confidentially" is interpreted as "if the number of DPTb voters at a place exceeds the maximum number of voters in the TPS determined by the KPU, a TPS based on DPTb voters "are irrelevant. Within the limits of reasonable reasoning, interpreting the phrase as stated in the text of the norm has the potential to threaten the "direct," "free," and "secret" principles, which are three of the six basic principles in exercising the right to vote

as contained in Article 22E paragraph (1 ) The 1945 Constitution. Therefore, if the phrase is interpreted as requested by the Petitioners, such interpretation will, in fact, be contrary to the spirit or spirit of Article 22E paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution.

Whereas even so, the Court understands and can capture the enthusiasm intended by the Petitioners regarding the need to open space for the KPU to establish additional TPS to serve and fulfill the right to eligible voters who have moved to elect. However, concerning this matter, it must be understood that the construction of norms regulating the final voter list and additional voter lists concerning the norms for establishing TPS in the Election Law has provided room for the KPU to establish additional TPS following the voter data in the DPT and DPTb.

hereas related to the Court's opinion, it can be further explained as follows: Article 210 paragraph (2) of the Election Law opens opportunities for voters registered in the DPT. They have experienced certain circumstances to move to another TPS / TPSLN. The opportunity to move to vote will have consequences for a shift in the number of voters from one place to another. Which shift can occur in a balanced manner between electoral districts because of the same number of voters who leave and enter one polling station. On the other hand, shifting of voters can also occur in a concentrated manner in certain areas, where voters' movement from and to TPS in a certain area is not balanced, causing an accumulation of voters whose number can exceed the maximum capacity of voters at the TPS. In such conditions, certainly, voters who move to elect who happen to be concentrated in certain areas will not exercise their right to vote. This can occur in several forms, such as the difference in the maximum limit of the number of voters at TPS is smaller than the number of voters in the DPTb; or the availability of the opportunity to

vote at a number of polling stations in one area is very small because the number of voters at the existing TPS reaches a maximum number of voters of 300 people following Article 11 of KPU Regulation Number 3 of 2019 concerning Voting and Counting of Votes in Elections. These conditions will certainly prevent registered voters in the DPTb from voting unless the KPU establishes additional TPS. In the event that the DPTb data held by the KPU shows that the right to vote can only be fulfilled by establishing additional TPS, the KPU as the election organizer who is responsible for fulfilling the right to vote for citizens, can establish additional TPS.

Whereas in accordance with the construction of norms regulating voter data in the Election Law, it can be understood that DPTb is not new voter data. Because the DPTb is the data of voters in the DPT who, due to certain circumstances, must move to another TPS. Thus, DPTb is voter data that is an inseparable part of the DPT. Therefore, when TPS was formed based on voter data in the DPT, it meant that the DPTb data also became part of the database that could be used as the basis for TPS formation. Thus, if the voter data in the DPT and DPTb do require additional TPS, then in accordance with the KPU's authority to regulate the number, location, form, and layout of TPS as stipulated in Article 350 paragraph (5) of the Election Law, the KPU can establish additional TPS according to the data. DPTb.

Whereas even though the Court has affirmed that the KPU can establish additional TPS as a consequence of opening the opportunity to move to vote for citizens through the Election Law, the establishment of additional TPS must still be done carefully by considering the real need for the fulfillment and service of the right to vote for citizens and considering the number of voters. In the DPTb. Based on the legal considerations, the Petitioners'

argument, which states that the phrase "guaranteeing that each voter can cast their votes directly, freely and confidentially" is interpreted as "if the number of DPTb voters at a place exceeds the maximum number of voters at the TPS determined by the KPU can be formed TPS based on DPTb voters "is not legally grounded.

#### 5.Regarding the Time Limit for Vote Counting.

That the 2019 Election is the first simultaneous election because, for the first time, the presidential and vice-presidential elections are being held simultaneously with the legislative member elections (namely elections to elect members of the DPR, DPD, Provincial DPRD, and Regency / Municipal DPRD), one of the consequences of the simultaneous elections is the increase in the types of letters and ballot boxes. If in the 2014 Election, in casu the legislative member elections, there are four ballot boxes, then in the 2019 Election, which combines the implementation of the presidential and vice-presidential elections held simultaneously with the legislative member elections, there are five ballot boxes. Within the limits of reasonable reasoning, such an operation will incur additional burdens in operation, including requiring a longer period of time. Moreover, the number of political parties participating in the 2019 Election is more than the 2014 Election. In this regard, Article 350 paragraph (1) of the Election Law anticipates limiting that the number of voters for each TPS is at most 500 people. In fact, after going through a simulation, in accordance with Article 11 paragraph (1) of KPU Regulation Number 3 of 2019 concerning Voting and Counting of Votes in General Elections, the KPU regulates that the number of voters for each TPS is at most 300 people.

Whereas the number of voters for each TPS has been set at a maximum of 300 people, with a large number of election participants, consisting of two pairs of presidential



candidates, 16 (sixteen) national and Aceh special political parties plus 4 (four) participating local political parties elections with three levels of elections, and individual candidates for DPD members, as well as the complex forms that must be filled in in the completion of the vote-counting process, the potential for non-completion of the vote-counting process on voting day is very open. This is not to mention that the election management apparatus's capacity and capability, especially at the polling station level, are taken into account.

Therefore, if this undesirable potential does occur, while the Election Law stipulates a concise time limit in counting the votes that must be completed on polling day, the validity of the election results will be open to question.

Whereas to overcome this potential problem, the provisions on the time limit for vote counting as stipulated in Article 383 paragraph (2) of the Election Law must be disclosed while still taking into account the potential for fraud that may occur. The potential for fraud will be unlocked if the vote-counting process is not completed on the voting day and is then continued the following day with a time lag. Therefore, according to the Court, an extension of the vote-counting period may only be carried out as long as the counting process is carried out continuously, up to a maximum of 12 hours from the end of the voting day at TPS / TPSLN. An extension to a maximum of 12 hours from the end of the voting day at TPS / TPSLN, which is 24.00 local time, is a reasonable time; if that time is extended even longer, it will cause other problems to the KPPS level.

Whereas, based on the above considerations, the Court believes that some of the Petitioners' arguments as far as the limitation of time for vote counting at TPS / TPSLN are

stipulated in Article 383 paragraph (2) of the Election Law are quite reasonable. However, in order to reduce all possible risks, especially the risk of fraud, it is sufficient to extend the vote-counting period for a maximum of 12 (twelve) hours. With that time, within reasonable limits of reasoning, it is more than enough to solve the potential for incomplete vote counting at TPS / TPSLN on polling day. In this regard, Article 383 paragraph (2) of the Election Law must be declared contrary to the 1945 Constitution as long as it is not interpreted, "Vote counting as referred to in paragraph (1) is only conducted and completed at the TPS / TPSLN concerned on voting day and if The counting of votes has not yet been completed, may be extended no later than 12 (twelve) hours from the end of the voting day. "

With the meaning of Article 383 paragraph (2) of the Election Law stated above, all norms containing the time limit related to or affected by the additional 12 (twelve) hours must also be adjusted to the said additional time.

Based on all the legal considerations above, the Court is of the opinion that the arguments of Petitioner I, Petitioner IV, Petitioner V, Petitioner VI, and Petitioner VII are legally grounded in part.

Thus, the Court subsequently issued a verdict which was as follows:

In Provision:

Granted the provisional petition of Petitioner I, Petitioner IV, Petitioner V, Petitioner VI, and Petitioner VII.

In the Principal of Application:

1.To grant Petitioner I, Petitioner IV, Petitioner V, Petitioner VI, and Petitioner VII partly;

2. Stating that the phrase "electronic identity card" in Article 348 paragraph (9) of Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning General Elections (State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia of 2017 Number 182 and Supplement to State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia Number 6109) is contrary to the Constitution The Republic of Indonesia of 1945 and does not have legally binding force conditionally as long as it is not interpreted as "including a certificate of electronic identity card recording issued by the population service and civil registration or other institutions of the like that have the authority to do so".
3. Stating the phrase "no later than 30 (thirty) days" in Article 210 paragraph (1) of Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning General Elections (State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia of 2017 Number 182 and Supplement to State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia Number 6109) is contrary to Law -The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia and does not have legally binding force conditionally as long as it is not interpreted "no later than 30 (thirty) days before voting day, except for voters due to unforeseen conditions beyond the ability and willingness of the voters due to illness, being hit by a disaster nature, being a prisoner, and for carrying out their duties at the time of voting are determined no later than 7 (seven) days before polling day".
4. Stating the phrase "only carried out and completed at the TPS / TPSLN concerned on voting day" in Article 383 paragraph (2) of Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning General Elections (State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia of 2017 Number 182 and Supplement to the State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia Number 6109) contradicts the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia and does not have legally binding force conditionally as long as it is not interpreted as "only done and finished at the TPS / TPSLN

concerned on polling day and in the event that the vote count has not been completed it can be extended without a pause of no later than 12 (twelve) hours from the end of the voting day".

5. Stating that the petition of Petitioner II and Petitioner III cannot be accepted.

6. Reject Petitioners I, Petitioners IV, Petitioners V, Petitioners VI, and Petitioner VII for others and the rest.

7. Order the loading of this decision in the State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia accordingly.